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1 
COPYRIGHT, DEATH, AND TAXES 
Edward Lee 
The Copyright Act of 1976 is nearing its fourth decade of 
existence.1  By historical standards, that longevity puts the 1976 Act 
“on the clock” for a major revision in the near future.  Indeed, given 
the incredible advances in digital technologies and the Internet—all 
of which were unforeseen by Congress back in 1976—the need for a 
major revision and modernization of copyright law may already be 
upon us.2 
This time around, however, Congress faces a challenge it has 
never faced before.  In none of the five previous copyright acts did 
Congress have international treaty obligations effectively limiting 
the alternatives available for reform.3  The Berne Convention and 
the TRIPS Agreement—which the United States joined in 1989 and 
2004, respectively—set forth numerous minimum standards of 
copyright law and restrict the scope of permissible copyright 
exceptions.4  Although these agreements do allow some flexibility for 
 
  Professor of Law, Director, Program in Intellectual Property Law, IIT 
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thanks to Jonathan Band, Evelyn Brody, Stephanie Hoffer, and Thomas 
Shinnick for comments on earlier drafts, and to the participants of the 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 2011 and faculty workshops at 
Chicago-Kent College of Law and Marquette University Law School.  I benefited 
from conversations with Kathleen Courtney regarding state tax incentives in 
film production, David Jakopin regarding tax and IP, Bruce Nash regarding 
Hollywood accounting, and Pamela Samuelson regarding copyright reform.  
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tracking down sources and creating the tables. 
 1. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
 2. See Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 553–54. 
 3. See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.  The United States joined 
the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”) in 1955, but the UCC 
accommodated the former U.S. approach to copyright (with formalities) and 
lacked an enforcement mechanism to stop violations.  See Universal Copyright 
Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 
178; Robert S. Chaloupka, International Aspects of Copyright Law, 15 INT’L HR 
J. 18, 18–19 (2006); Tyler Ochoa, Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under 
the 1909 Copyright Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 299–
300 (2010). 
 4. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18338 [hereinafter Berne 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940109
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countries to shape their own copyright laws in some respects, in 
other areas the requirements are more fixed.5  A number of basic 
features of copyright law—a set of required exclusive rights 
including rights for derivative works, a ban on formalities for foreign 
works, and a term that lasts at least the life of the author plus fifty 
years—are now all set in Berne stone.6  TRIPS adds to the 
calcification of copyright by imposing additional requirements on 
countries.7 
Of course, one way of dealing with the international copyright 
treaties would be to modernize them as well.  Indeed, some of the 
provisions of the Berne Convention, which date back to the early 
1900s, if not earlier, may need modernizing more than the U.S. 
Copyright Act.8  Amending international copyright treaties, 
 
Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights arts. 9–14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197–1226, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
304–17 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  The TRIPS Agreement 
incorporates Articles 1 through 21 and the Appendix thereto of the Berne 
Convention, thereby including them within the scope of WTO enforcement 
proceedings.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 9(1). 
 5. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 
483–84, 492 (2010) (“[M]ore than two-thirds of the provisions [in TRIPS] sought 
to introduce, in a single undertaking, new substantive minimum standards on 
which there was no prior international consensus.”).   See generally GRAEME B. 
DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME: THE RESILIENCE OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE (forthcoming Mar. 2012) 
(arguing that TRIPS is best understood as allowing considerable flexibility for 
member countries to meet minimum standards); Edward Lee, The Global Trade 
Mark (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (discussing extent to 
which TRIPS allows varied approaches among members). 
 6. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1–18, (setting forth minimum 
standards of copyright). 
 7. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 9–14. 
 8. For example, the ban against formalities in Berne Article 5(2) dates 
back to 1908.  See DANIEL CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 96–97 (2006).  Some scholars question the continuing abidance to this 
early twentieth century rule, which makes it difficult to identify and locate 
copyright owners.  See Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the Digital Era: An 
Obstacle or Opportunity? in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE 
THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 395, 395–98 (Lionel Bently et 
al. eds., 2010); see also STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE 15–51 (2011) 
(discussing how formalities function in intellectual property systems).  
Likewise, the rule of the shorter term in Article 7(8) requires countries to give, 
absent legislation to the contrary, foreign works a shorter term of copyright as 
set by their country of origin instead of the longer term granted to domestic 
works.  Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(8).  This provision, which also 
dates back to 1908, was adopted to create a transition and an incentive for 
newly joining countries that had shorter terms to raise their terms to the 
minimum standard of the life of the author plus fifty years.  See CHOW & LEE, 
supra, at 218.  Because all Berne countries are now required to have a term of 
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however, requires agreement by a consensus or the unanimity of 
member countries.9  Getting consensus among World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) countries about a major copyright revision—
such as abandoning some of the outdated Berne features—would be 
difficult, to say the least.  No doubt it would be more difficult than 
getting a simple majority of Congress to enact a revision of U.S. 
copyright law. 
Thus, at least in the short-term, Congress may be better off 
exploring options for reforming copyright law within the current 
TRIPS/Berne framework, while working in the long-term with the 
Executive Branch and U.S. Trade Representative to modernize 
international IP agreements.  That way, the United States can begin 
to modernize its copyright law instead of waiting for consensus 
among WTO and Berne countries on copyright reform.  The 
downside, however, is that many U.S. reform proposals may face the 
same stumbling block: the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement 
may restrict, if not preclude, many copyright reforms in domestic 
law.  “Can’t do it because it’s a Berne violation” has become an all-
too-common refrain to torpedo numerous ideas for improving or 
modernizing our copyright system.10  Because of these international 
requirements, the ability of WTO countries to enact new, innovative 
approaches to copyright law is circumscribed. 
To deal with this problem, this Article offers a new alternative 
for copyright reform: tax law.  I call this approach the “tax fix” for 
copyright law, in that tax law is used to fix problems or inefficiencies 
in our copyright system.  Using the tax system as a way to 
modernize our copyright system offers several advantages.  Most 
important, tax law can fix problems in our copyright system without 
 
at least the life of the author plus fifty years, the original reason for the rule of 
the shorter term is no longer relevant.  Yet, a negative effect of the rule is that 
it puts pressure on all member countries to raise their copyright terms to 
whatever is the longest term recognized by any member; otherwise, the other 
countries’ citizens might be disadvantaged with a shorter term in the country 
that has a longer term.  See id. at 219. 
 9. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
art. X, ¶ 8, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994) (declaring 
that a consensus of members is required for amendment to TRIPS Agreement); 
Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(3) (declaring that “any revision of this 
Act . . . shall require unanimity of the votes cast”). 
 10. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory 
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 
345 (2010); Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO 
Internet Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2391 (2009); Aryeh L. Pomerantz, 
Obtaining Copyright Licenses by Prescriptive Easement: A Solution to the 
Orphan Works Problem, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 203–04 (2010); R. Anthony 
Reese, Photographs of Public Domain Paintings: How, If At All, Should We 
Protect Them?, 34 J. CORP. L. 1033, 1052–53 (2009); Christina M. Costanzo, 
Comment, Have Orphan Works Found a Home in Class Action Settlements?, 83 
TEMP. L. REV. 569, 586–87 (2011). 
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violating the Berne Convention or TRIPS Agreement, and without 
requiring amendment to either treaty.  Tax law can also be used to 
incentivize the copyright industries to adopt new, innovative 
approaches to copyright in ways that voluntary reforms like 
Creative Commons cannot.  The tax fix has the added benefit of 
offering, beyond the “one size fits all” approach, greater tailoring of 
copyrights by both industries and individuals—which may, in turn, 
lead to greater efficiency. 
Part I discusses the need for a major revision of copyright law in 
the twenty-first century.  Past historical practice and new 
technological changes both suggest a major revision of copyright law 
is due.  Yet two major obstacles—political stalemate and 
international treaty obligations—dim the prospect for achieving the 
necessary modernization of copyright law. 
Part II introduces the concept of the tax fix for copyright law 
and shows its possible advantages.  Tax is one method that is given 
a great deal of consideration in other areas where incentives are 
important, but, surprisingly, is discussed hardly at all in copyright 
law.  The tax fix is not a panacea for the inefficiencies and 
obsolescence in our copyright system.  Nor is it meant as the sole 
method of modernizing copyright law.  Instead, the tax fix is offered 
as another possible tool in the toolbox of options for Congress to 
modernize the copyright system. 
Part III explains how the tax fix can address inefficiencies 
within our copyright system.  Two types of tax fixes are offered: (1) a 
“copyright gains” tax, which establishes a preferential tax rate for 
income derived from certain socially beneficial initiatives related to 
copyrighted works, and (2) a copyright tax credit that grants a credit 
for such initiatives.  For illustrative purposes, this Article shows 
how tax law can be used to reduce the problem and inefficiencies 
created by orphan works and the lack of copyright registration, 
lengthy copyright terms, and the lack of clear copyright exemptions.  
It also illustrates how tax law can be used to help address the 
problem of spiraling costs of textbooks in schools.  Although the 
solutions offered by the tax fix are not perfect, they are second-best 
alternatives that may give Congress a more flexible way to address 
some of the inefficiencies of our copyright system, without requiring 
any change in our international treaty obligations.  Part IV 
addresses possible concerns. 
I.  THE COPYRIGHT PARADOX: MODERNIZING COPYRIGHT  
LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
This Part discusses the paradox copyright law faces today: a 
major revision to the Copyright Act of 1976 is needed more than 
ever, but it is even harder to achieve such reform today.  This 
paradox will plague Congress’s efforts to enact a major copyright 
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revision that can deal with the advances in technology of the 
twenty-first century. 
A. Need for Copyright Reform 
1. Historical Practice: The Forty-Year Cycle of Revision 
If historical practice is a guide,11 then the U.S. copyright system 
is due for a general revision or major updating.  The Copyright Act 
has undergone general revisions roughly every forty years,12 which 
means that the next revision should be made by 2016. 
The pattern of revision is rather striking.  The 1790 Act, the 
first copyright act in the United States,13 was replaced by the 1831 
Act.14  The 1831 Act was replaced by the 1870 Act,15 which was later 
replaced by the 1909 Act.16  Finally, the 1909 Act was replaced by 
the current 1976 Act.17  Although the 1976 Act took longer than 
forty years from its predecessor to enact, Congress began studies for 
copyright reform overseen by the Copyright Office starting in 1955, 
or forty-six years from the enactment of the 1909 Act.18  (In between 
and after these major revisions, other amendments were enacted to 
the then-existing Act.) 
In each revision, Congress attempted to modernize copyright 
law to address the changing time period and new types of works and 
technologies.  From its inception, copyright law has struggled to 
keep pace with the advances in technology—for example, the 
printing press, pianola, camera, radio, film, television, VCR, 
computer, and now the Internet, digital technologies, and social 
media.  The history of copyright suggests that Congress should 
begin to study whether a general revision or major updating of the 
Copyright Act is needed for the twenty-first century.  The last 
general revision occurred more than thirty-five years ago, long 
before the incredible advances brought on by the Internet.  As 
 
 11. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (“To comprehend the 
scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic.’” (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921))). 
 12. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 556. 
 13. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) [hereinafter 
1790 Act]. 
 14. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870) [hereinafter 
1831 Act]. 
 15. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909) 
[hereinafter 1870 Act]. 
 16. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) 
[hereinafter 1909 Act]. 
 17. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (effective 
Jan. 1, 1978) [hereinafter 1976 Act]. 
 18. See Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955, ch. 568, 69 Stat. 499; 
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 221 n.33 (2010). 
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Pamela Samuelson encapsulates, “the 1976 Act was passed with a 
1950s/60s mentality built into it, just at a time when computer and 
communication technology advances were about to raise the most 
challenging and vexing copyright questions ever encountered.”19 
2. Inefficiencies of the Copyright System in the Twenty-First 
Century 
The forty-year lifespan of previous copyright acts tells only half 
the story.  The more important reason a copyright revision is needed 
is that the current 1976 Act is showing its age.20  It has produced 
glaring inefficiencies, which have become more pronounced in our 
digital age. 
a.  Notice Externalities and Orphan Works 
One clear deficiency is the creation of a copyright system that 
grants relatively long terms of copyright for all works—for 
individuals, the life of the author plus seventy years—while 
allowing those works to go unregistered, meaning there is no public 
record or registry identifying titles or owners of most copyrighted 
works.21  Currently, copyright registration is required in the United 
States only to bring a copyright infringement lawsuit for works 
originating in the United States.22  Foreign works are not subject to 
this requirement because the Berne Convention prohibits the use of 
formalities by member countries in such instance.23  Copyright 
registration in the United States also entitles the copyright owner to 
elect possible statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and 
attorneys’ fees in successful litigation.24  However, because so few 
copyright lawsuits are ever brought,25 the incentives for registration 
of U.S. works are modest and are probably more relevant to the 
major U.S. copyright industries, such as publishing, music, and 
movies. 
The lack of an effective registration system for copyrighted 
works produces substantial “notice externalities,” to borrow a term 
 
 19. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 555. 
 20. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) 
(“The statute was not well-designed to withstand change, and has aged badly.”). 
 21. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04, 408 (2006).  For U.S. works, registration is a 
requirement to bring an infringement lawsuit, but relatively few copyright 
lawsuits are brought each year.  See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-
Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1476–77 (stating that in 2006, 
only 4944 copyright suits were filed, with most not ever going to trial). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006). 
 23. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art 5(2). 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504–05. 
 25. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1476–77 (stating that just roughly 5000 suits 
were filed in 2006). 
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coined by Peter Menell and Michael Meurer.26  These notice 
externalities impose huge external costs on the ability of the public 
to use and license copyrighted works.  Put simply, for many works, 
there is no way for the public to figure out who owns the copyright. 
This combination of lengthy terms and lack of registration 
contributes to the so-called “orphan works” problem, meaning it is 
practically impossible for people to locate or identify the copyright 
holder of many copyrighted works, especially those published 
decades ago, in order to seek permission to use the works.27  Without 
registration or registry of owners, the works have become effectively 
“orphaned.”  And, because copyright law still protects these orphan 
works, people who wish to utilize the works cannot do so out of fear 
of being sued.28 
A major reason for the orphan works problem is the lack of an 
effective copyright registration system—which is ironic with all the 
modern technology and vast databases we have.  Even with 
wondrous technologies at our disposal, our copyright system is stuck 
in the 1908 Berne Convention world of no formalities.29  In other 
areas of property, such as title to land, ownership of a patent, or 
trademark registration, a public registry facilitates transactions 
related to a property in the registry by enabling the public to locate 
the relevant owner.30  Because our copyright system lacks a 
comprehensive database of works under copyright,31 the public may 
have no practicable way of locating the relevant owner of a work, 
particularly if the work was created long ago, such as in the 1920s 
or 1930s. 
Empirical studies have identified an alarming number of 
orphan works both here and abroad.  In response to the U.S. 
Copyright Office study, Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”) 
conducted a three-year survey of its own collection.  CMU 
determined that copyright owners could not be located for 22% of the 
books in its survey.32  The percentage of orphan works jumped to 
 
 26. See Peter S. Menell & Michael Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice 
Externalities (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 11-58, 2011), available 
at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents 
/MenellP-MeurerM121611.pdf. 
 27. See Joshua O. Mausner, Copyright Orphan Works: A Multi-Pronged 
Solution to Solve a Harmful Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395, 398 
(2007). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
 30. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 477 (2003) (“Equally immense tracing costs 
would be required to determine the ownership of a parcel of land if titles to land 
were not recorded in a public registry.  It is not perpetual property rights but 
the absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing costs.”). 
 31. See Mausner, supra note 27, at 412. 
 32. See Letter from Denise Troll Covey, Principal Librarian for Special 
Projects, Carnegie Mellon Univ., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & 
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over 60% for older works published in the 1920s.33  Moreover, even 
when copyright owners were identified, 36% of them did not reply at 
all to CMU’s multiple letters.34  Cornell University Library faced 
similar problems and could not locate the copyright owners of 58% of 
343 copyrighted monographs in its collection, while spending over 
$50,000 in staff time dealing with copyright issues.35  The Library of 
Congress estimated in 1993 that 80% of films created before 1929 
were orphan works and were at risk of deterioration due to the 
inability to get permission to preserve the films.36  A study in the 
United Kingdom estimated that UK museums, galleries, and 
archives may have over 50 million orphan works.37  According to a 
British Library estimate, 40% of all printed works are orphan 
works, and more than 50% of sound recordings surveyed in its 
collection are orphan works.38 
Congress is well aware of the orphan works problem, but, 
unfortunately, has failed to address it.  In 2006, after a year of 
studying the issue, the Copyright Office issued its Report on Orphan 
Works, which recommended that Congress enact a copyright 
provision to allow good faith users to use an orphan work without a 
license if they could not find the copyright holder of the orphan work 
after a reasonably diligent search.39  If the copyright holder later 
appeared, the user would have to pay reasonable compensation to 
the copyright holder for use of the work.40  Both the House and 
 
Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with Carnegie Mellon 
Univ. Libraries), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments 
/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Letter from Sarah E. Thomas, Carl A. Kroch Univ. Librarian, 
Cornell Univ. Library, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l 
Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf. 
 36. See LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, REPORT ON FILM PRESERVATION 1993: A 
STUDY OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN FILM PRESERVATION 5 (1993). 
 37. See JISC, IN FROM THE COLD: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCOPE OF “ORPHAN 
WORKS” AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC 18 (2009), 
available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/publications/reports/2009/infromthecold.aspx; 
see also Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book 
Search and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 236–37 (2011) (discussing the results of 
various studies). 
 38. See GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69 (2006), available at 
www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/0118404830/0118404830.pdf 
[hereinafter GOWERS REVIEW]; THE BRITISH LIBRARY MANIFESTO, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: A BALANCE 3 (2006), available at http://www.cpic.ru/news/IP 
_Manifesto_final.pdf. 
 39. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 95 (2006) 
[hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov 
/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 40. See id. at 96. 
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Senate held hearings, and several bills modeled in part on the 
Copyright Office proposal were entertained.41  However, Congress 
has yet to put any of the bills to a full vote.42  Congress’s inaction on 
the orphan works problem even appeared to draw thinly veiled 
criticism from the Department of Justice in its objection to the 
proposed settlement of the Google Book Search case, in which the 
private parties attempted to solve the orphan works problem on 
their own by setting up a Book Rights Registry.43 
b.  Obsolescence in an Age of Digital Technologies 
Another deficiency is the 1976 Act’s construction based on a 
model of printing and analog technologies—a framework that 
translates poorly with today’s digital technologies, which routinely 
make copies of works by their operation.44  Not surprisingly, the two 
most substantial studies on copyright reform to date—Samuelson’s 
Copyright Principles Project in the United States and Ian 
Hargreaves’s Review in the United Kingdom—both identified the 
advances in digital technologies as a major reason why reform of 
copyright laws is needed today.45 
By their design, digital technologies produce digital copies of 
material incidental to their operation.  For example, a digital copy of 
a computer’s operating system is created in random-access memory 
(“RAM”) every time a person turns on the computer.46  Whenever a 
person views a website, a copy is downloaded onto the computer’s 
 
 41. See Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); see also The 
“Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Committee 
of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131 (2008). 
 42. See Betsy McKenzie, Orphan Works, OUT OF THE JUNGLE (Apr. 18, 2011, 
9:40 AM), http://outofthejungle.blogspot.com/2011/04/orphan-works.html. 
 43. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding 
Proposed Class Action Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 
8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), at 3 (“In particular, the rediscovery of 
currently unused or inaccessible works and the digitization of those works in 
formats that are accessible to persons with disabilities are important public 
policy goals.  The United States believes that, although the actions of private 
entities and Congress (if necessary), steps should be taken to advance these 
objectives.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.pdf. 
 44. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 554–55. 
 45. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 3 (2011) [hereinafter HARGREAVES REVIEW] available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf; PAMELA SAMUELSON & MEMBERS 
OF THE CPP, THE COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 2–3, 
18–19 (2010) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT], available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_CPP.pdf. 
 46. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
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RAM and cache or temporary Internet folder.47  In order to access 
the website, copies of the webpage are transmitted internally 
through the Internet and an Internet service provider’s lines.48  
When a person uses Google or another search engine to find a 
website, the ability to find the website was created by the search 
engine’s ability to create an index of websites with digital copies 
stored on the search engine’s servers.49  The 1976 Act does not 
directly address the legality of any of these digital copies but, 
instead, relegates them to potential infringement claims as a 
violation of the right to copy.50  Courts have struggled to make sense 
of when the use of digital copies (including ones internal to a 
machine) should be considered infringing or permissible fair use.51  
This lack of clarity in the law can chill investment in and 
development of new digital technologies.52 
Even when Congress has enacted updates to the 1976 Act to 
address digital technologies, the results have not been reassuring.  
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
(“DPRA”) is, put charitably, a complete failure in legislative 
drafting.  As David Nimmer put it, “[T]his amendment was by far 
the worst thing that had happened to date to copyright law. . . . The 
DPRA is a masterpiece of incoherence.”53  DPRA recognized a right 
of digital public performance for sound recordings (relevant to 
webcasting of music) and amended § 114 to define limitations of that 
right.54  Yet the provisions defining those limitations are, to borrow 
the then-Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters’s assessment, 
“utterly incomprehensible to most people.”55 
 
 47. See John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject 
Common Sense Into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 891 (2007). 
 48. See Hannibal Travis, Opting Out of the Internet in the United States 
and the European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 331, 362–63 (2008). 
 49. See Sieman, supra note 47, at 889–91. 
 50. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  In 1998, Congress created the DMCA safe 
harbors for ISPs for certain activities of providing Internet access, caching, 
storage, and location tools.  See id. § 512. 
 51. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d 
Cir. 2008); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2004); 
MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 522–23 (RAM copies infringing); see also Edward Lee, 
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 801–02 (2010). 
 52. See HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 45, at 3 (“Digital communications 
technology involves routine copying of text, images and data, meaning that 
copyright law has started to act as a regulatory barrier to the creation of certain 
kinds of new, internet based businesses.”). 
 53. David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
1233, 1336 (2004). 
 54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114(d) (2006). 
 55. See Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights 
of Authors Reborn, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 169, 173 (2008). 
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The safe harbors afforded to Internet service providers (“ISPs”) 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) have 
done a better job of modernizing copyright law.  The DMCA safe 
harbors provide ISPs immunity from copyright liability if they meet 
certain requirements, such as complying with the “notice-and-
takedown” requirement for allegedly infringing material stored by 
their users on their servers.56  The notice-and-takedown procedure—
although not without its abuses and deficiencies57—has provided a 
decent way to divide the burdens of monitoring possible copyright 
infringement online.58  Yet, even with their successes, the DMCA 
safe harbors have not kept up with advances in technology.  Drafted 
in 1998, the DMCA safe harbors did not anticipate social media and 
Web 2.0 technologies that encourage user sharing of and 
interactivity with material on the Internet.59  The billion-dollar 
lawsuit against YouTube, now on appeal, is a byproduct of the lack 
of clarity in the DMCA safe harbors’ application to new 
technologies.60 
The many complex issues of copyright law raised by digital 
technologies demand a more comprehensive and coherent approach.  
In 1976, Congress did not have the opportunity to devise a copyright 
system specifically for our digital age.61  In the next copyright 
revision, Congress will have that chance. 
c.  “One Size Fits All” Approach 
One of the lessons to draw from these examples is that 
copyright law must become more adept and flexible.  It must be 
revised and modernized to address the glaring, chronic inefficiencies 
in the copyright system, such as the orphan works problem and 
 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 57. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: 
Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
171, 176 (2010) (criticizing DMCA safe harbor process as chilling speech and 
raising First Amendment concerns); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, 
Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 621, 684 (2006) (discussing a study showing copyright holders file 
questionable takedown notices in 22.5% of DMCA notices surveyed). 
 58. See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 233, 252–55, 259–60 (2009).  Several countries have adopted similar 
approaches to ISP safe harbors requiring a notice-and-takedown process.  See 
Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for 
Unlawful Third Party Content, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 337–53 (2010) 
(discussing approaches in the United States, European Union, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand). 
 59. See Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the 
DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 437 (2008). 
 60. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516, 518–19, 
526–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Lee, supra note 58, at 258–59. 
 61. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 551–54. 
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huge notice externalities.  It also must transform its monolithic 
approach to copyright into a more nimble approach that helps to 
foster innovation in both content production and technologies.62 
A growing body of research indicates that applying a monolithic 
or “one size fits all” approach to copyright for all works is inefficient, 
in that the social benefit of many works is not ever realized.63  The 
orphan works problem provides one good example—granting all 
works the same long term of copyright protection leads to under-
utilization of the works because some owners abandon them but are 
still protected by copyrights for their works.  By some estimates, 
only two percent of all copyrighted works are commercially 
exploited,64 yet the Copyright Act grants all works copyrights as if 
they all will be commercially exploited for generations.  Another 
example of inefficiencies in our copyright system is the application 
of the long term of copyright (ninety-five years) to computer 
software, given the short shelf life of software.65 
B. Obstacles to U.S. Copyright Law Revisions 
Although a revision of the Copyright Act is needed to modernize 
copyright law, two major roadblocks stand in its way: (1) politics, 
and (2) international treaties. 
1. Political Stalemate in Congress 
Copyright issues have become intensely politicized and 
polarized in the United States.66  Copyright industries disagree with 
ISPs over the scope of liability or safe harbor protection for ISPs for 
infringing activity conducted by their users.  Copyright holders want 
more liability and duties imposed on ISPs, while ISPs want greater 
 
 62. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 
102–05 (2004) (discussing regulatory copyright and its affect on industries); 
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 
(2004) (“[T]he main challenges for twenty first century copyright are not 
challenges of authorship policy, but rather new and harder problems for 
copyright’s communications policy: copyright’s poorly understood role in 
regulating competition among rival disseminators.”). 
 63. See, e.g., THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE 
SIZE FIT ALL? (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) (collecting fourteen 
articles on intellectual property law); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit 
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1361, 1389–90 (2009). 
 64. See GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 38, at 69. 
 65. See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A 
First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 75, 135 (2002). 
 66. See Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 317 (2009); COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 
45, at 4. 
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protection afforded to them by the safe harbors.67  Moreover, 
copyright industries typically want a broader scope and duration of 
copyrights and stronger enforcement provisions against infringers.68  
However, public interest groups representing libraries, educators, 
and users typically seek a narrower scope of copyright and a greater 
recognition of exemptions or activities as fair use.69  The debates 
over copyright—too often called a “war”—have sometimes 
degenerated into name-calling and vitriol, even resulting in threats 
of bodily harm.70 
Disagreement among copyright stakeholders translates into 
political stalemate in Congress because copyright legislation is 
drafted by lobbyists employed by the stakeholders, not by members 
of Congress or their staff.71  Under this culture in which copyright 
lobbyists control the shape and even the language of copyright bills, 
the passage of a bill may depend more on getting lobbyists to agree 
than on the actual merits of the bill. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 took decades of study, hearings, and 
debate before Congress eventually reached an agreement.72  The 
agreement was, in part, facilitated by the Copyright Office’s 
oversight in conducting meetings with and brokering compromise 
among various stakeholders.73  In today’s even more polarized 
environment, one can only imagine how long it might take to reach a 
compromise among stakeholders on major issues needed for reform.  
At the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., 
former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters applauded the 
discussion of reforms to the Copyright Act, but soberly admitted that 
we are “not ready” to undertake such reforms.74 
2. International Obligations Under Berne/TRIPS 
Even if politics were not a major obstacle to copyright reform, 
international treaties pose hurdles of their own.  The United States 
 
 67. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337 
(2002); COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 45, at 20. 
 68. See Litman, supra note 67. 
 69. See Laura N. Gasaway, Impasse: Distance Learning and Copyright, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 810–14 (2001); Litman, supra note 66, at 315. 
 70. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 11–14 
(2009); Litman, supra note 66, at 315. 
 71. See Litman, supra note 66, at 314. 
 72. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989) 
(stating that the 1976 Copyright Act, “which almost completely revised existing 
copyright law, was the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives 
of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office 
and, to a lesser extent, by Congress”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Marybeth Peters, Statement at Annual Meeting, Copyright Society of 
the USA, Panel on “To Reform or Not to Reform: That Is the Question” (June 
10, 2011). 
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is a member of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, 
both of which establish “minimum standards” or requirements for 
copyright law.75  TRIPS incorporates Articles 1 through 21 and the 
Appendix of the Berne Convention, so there is overlap between the 
two.76 
Given the minimum standards required by Berne and TRIPS, 
copyright reform in the United States cannot be written on a blank 
slate.  Reforms must consider how a country’s international 
obligations will be satisfied, or the country may risk a challenge to 
its law before the WTO.  The minimum standards of Berne apply 
only to foreign works (i.e., how each country treats works from 
foreign countries), meaning each country has discretion to use a 
different approach for its own domestic works.77  More often than 
not, however, countries adopt a single approach under copyright law 
for both domestic and foreign works.78 
So how do Berne and TRIPS limit the field of options for 
revising or modernizing copyright law?  They limit the field by 
codifying a particular model of copyright—what rights it entails, 
how long it should last, and what exceptions can be allowed.  These 
so-called “minimum standards” of copyright allow some flexibility, 
but typically do not allow a dramatic departure from the conception 
of copyright the treaties envision. 
For example, several of the minimum standards of Berne, which 
are also incorporated into TRIPS, present obstacles for recent 
proposals for copyright reform.  In the debate over orphan works, 
some proposals seek to require registration of copyrighted works in 
order to create a public record of copyright owners, so that would-be 
licensees can seek permission from the copyright owner of a work.79  
Article 5(2) of Berne, however, prohibits “any formality,” such as 
registration, being imposed as a condition on “[t]he enjoyment and 
exercise of” copyright for foreign works.80  To avoid this prohibition, 
Chris Sprigman proposes that unregistered works be subject to a 
“‘default’ license that allows [third-party] use [of the unregistered 
 
 75. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 218–20 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
 76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9.  The key practical difference 
between the two is that TRIPS is subject to enforcement proceedings under the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, whereas the Berne Convention has no 
comparable enforcement body.  See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 77. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country 
of origin is governed by domestic law.”). 
 78. See CHOW & LEE, supra note 8, at 95–96. 
 79. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 485, 552, 555 (2004). 
 80. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
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works] for a predetermined fee.”81  It is at least debatable whether 
Sprigman’s proposal violates Berne (or Article 13 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which limits copyright exceptions82). 
Likewise, in the debate over copyright terms, some proposals 
seek to shorten the term of copyright so that works that are not 
commercially exploited will enter the public domain sooner.83  
Article 7(1) of Berne, however, requires a minimum term of the life 
of the author plus fifty years for foreign works.84  Unless Congress 
wanted to create shorter terms only for U.S. works, the proposal to 
reduce the copyright term below the Berne minimum standard is 
not a viable option.  Moreover, even if Congress adopted shorter 
terms only for U.S. works, thus complying with Berne Article 7(1), 
such an amendment could disadvantage U.S. authors abroad.  
Article 7(8), also known as the “rule of the shorter term,” creates a 
default approach requiring, absent legislation to the contrary, that 
countries give foreign works a shorter term from their country of 
origin rather than a longer term that applies to domestic works.85  
The rule of the shorter term thus puts pressure on countries to 
increase their copyright terms to whatever is the longest term of 
copyright recognized by a Berne country, in order to avoid having 
their citizens’ works subjected to a shorter term in the longest-term 
country in Berne.  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998 (which extended the term of U.S. copyrights to life plus seventy 
years to match the European Union’s term) was justified precisely 
on this ground.86 
In short, given the minimum standards of copyright under 
Berne and TRIPS, member countries do not have complete freedom 
to alter dramatically their copyright laws—at least not without 
potentially violating international treaty obligations.  The challenge 
for Congress is to figure out a way to modernize U.S. copyright law 
within the constraints set by these international agreements, or to 
have those agreements changed as well. 
II.  THE TAX FIX FOR COPYRIGHT LAW 
This Part lays out the theory for using the Tax Code to achieve 
copyright reforms and objectives.  Surprisingly, tax law has been 
underutilized in promoting the goals of copyright.  This Part 
explains why Congress should consider using tax incentives to 
further copyright objectives and reform. 
 
 81. Sprigman, supra note 79, at 555. 
 82. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13. 
 83. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 
287–93 (2004). 
 84. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(1). 
 85. Id. art. 7(8). 
 86. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003). 
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A. Using the Tax Code to Achieve Non-Tax Goals 
Historically, Congress has used the Tax Code to achieve a 
variety of “non-tax” goals, meaning substantive policy goals outside 
of taxation.87  Indeed, the Tax Code is littered with provisions of this 
kind.88  Many of these provisions offer tax incentives through 
“deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and 
preferential rates,”89 in order to incentivize certain conduct or 
activity.  For example, to encourage enrollment in higher education 
and to help offset some of its increasing costs, the Tax Code provides 
a modest deduction for certain tuition expenses.90  The Tax Code 
also offers a modest tax credit for eligible businesses to conduct 
research and development.91  Sometimes, the Tax Code imposes 
unfavorable treatment (commonly called Pigouvian taxes after the 
theorist who championed their use) to discourage people from 
certain activities, such as smoking or excess fuel consumption.92  
Although the substantive policy goals are quite diverse, all of these 
“non-tax goal” provisions typically seek to incentivize activity or 
conduct through the Tax Code by creating either more or less 
favorable treatment under the Code.  When the tax incentives cost 
the government revenue (in terms of lost tax revenue), they are 
called “tax expenditures.”93 
Using the Tax Code as a method to address important societal 
issues or initiatives has become a popular option for pursuing policy 
and reform proposals.  To address the epidemic problem of obesity in 
the United States, proposals to tax junk food and soda have been 
offered.94  To promote more environmentally responsible or “green” 
technology and energy consumption, the Tax Code contains several 
 
 87. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 707 (1970). 
 88. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21-26 (2006) (various personal credits); id. §§ 27, 30-
30D (other credits); id. §§ 31-36A (refundable credits); id. §§ 38-45Q (business 
related credits); id. § 54 (credit to holders of clean renewable energy bonds); id. 
§ 54A-54F (qualified tax credit bonds); id. § 54AA (credit for Build America 
bonds). 
 89. Surrey, supra note 87, at 706; see also id. at 713. 
 90. I.R.C. § 25A, 222 (2006); see also Bradley R. Palmer, Uncle Sam, 
Tuition Costs, and the Changing Economy: Tax Incentives for Education 
Expenses and How to Improve Them, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 345, 345 (2009). 
 91. I.R.C. § 41 (2006); see also Evan Wamsley, Note, The Definition of 
Qualified Research Under the Section 41 Research and Development Tax Credit: 
Its Impact on the Credit’s Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV. 165, 166 (2001). 
 92. See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1932); W. Kip 
Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 
J.L. & ECON. 575, 581–83 (1999). 
 93. See Surrey, supra note 87, at 706. 
 94. See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes 
in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25 (2005). 
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tax credits and incentives.95  The Obama Administration’s 
controversial individual health care mandate attempts to fix the 
problem of the lack of health care insurance for millions of people 
and escalating health care costs by taxing individuals who choose 
not to have health care coverage.96  Likewise, the preferential 
treatment of long-term capital gains in the Tax Code—which are 
taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income—is justified as a way to 
encourage entrepreneurial investments and risk-taking that might 
lead to innovation.97  The several tax benefits for homeowners are 
justified as serving “important non-tax policy objectives such as 
encouraging investment in commodity, enhancing the stability of 
neighborhoods, and increasing the willingness of property owners to 
fund local schools through property taxes.”98  In response to the 
recent housing crisis, Congress amended the Tax Code to provide 
tax credits for first-time and other homebuyers.99 
Of course, some tax experts are skeptical about whether the Tax 
Code is the proper forum for pursuing non-tax policy objectives.  In 
his seminal article, Stanley Surrey argued that direct government 
expenditures to achieve a policy goal are preferable to indirect 
expenditures through the Tax Code because “a resort to tax 
incentives greatly decreases the ability of the Government to 
maintain control over the management of its priorities,” while 
complicating the Tax Code, reducing its overall transparency, and 
possibly entrenching certain tax exemptions that have outlived their 
usefulness.100  Surrey’s critique has generated a longstanding debate 
over the desirability of non-tax policy uses of the Tax Code,101 a 
debate that is likely to intensify as national debt reduction 
continues to be a hot button issue.  This Article does not attempt to 
 
 95. See Richard P. Manczak & Jeffrey D. Moss, “Green” Tax Incentives, 90 
MICH. B. J. 27, 28–29 (2011); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 45, 48, 136, 168 (2006). 
 96. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Florida 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1255–60 (11th Cir. 
2011) (explaining the individual mandate in the Tax Code). 
 97. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 509 (1941) (citing H.R. Rep. 
No. 67-350, at 8 (1921)) (justifying preferential rate for capital gains “as the 
means of encouraging profit-taking sales of capital investments”); Noël B. 
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 
TAX L. REV. 319, 340–41 (1993). 
 98. John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2002).  See generally Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 97 
(discussing the arguments in favor of and opposing a lower tax rate for capital 
gains versus ordinary income). 
 99. See The Homebuyer Assistance Improvement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-198. 
 100. See Surrey, supra note 87, at 731–32. 
 101. For more on Surrey’s view, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX 
REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 30–31 (1973). 
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resolve this debate but will offer a response in Part IV to some of the 
concerns raised by tax expenditures.  Suffice it to say, Congress has 
frequently used the Tax Code to further important national 
objectives.  Using tax to further copyright objectives would not be an 
anomaly. 
B. Current Uses of Tax Related to Copyrighted Works 
1. Federal Tax Code 
For whatever reason, tax incentives have rarely been used for 
copyright or other intellectual property objectives.  Royalties from 
copyrights are taxed as ordinary income at the general tax rates for 
that income earner.102  The Code excludes copyrights from being 
treated as a capital asset with its potential benefit of the lower 
capital gains tax rate.103  Copyrights are essentially an afterthought 
in the Tax Code, if a thought at all. 
One small exception is the recent amendment in the Tax Code 
that allows sales of copyrights of musical works to be taxed at the 
preferential capital gains rate (currently fifteen percent104).  In 
2005, Congress created an exception for musical works that allows 
songwriters to elect to receive the capital gains tax rate for sales of 
their compositions.105  The Nashville Songwriters Association 
lobbied for the capital gains treatment of sales of copyrights in 
musical compositions, under a bill originally titled the Songwriters 
Capital Gains Tax Equity Act.106  The Association argued that the 
new law would bring equity to the treatment of songwriters 
compared to music publishers who historically could invoke capital 
gains treatment for sales of their copyrighted songs.107  The 
Association also argued that the tax break could help save the 
profession of songwriting given the losses allegedly caused by music 
file sharing.108 
 
 102. I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (including royalties with gross income). 
 103. See id. § 1221(a)(3) (stating that capital asset does not include “a 
copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition”). 
 104. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
27, tit. III, sec. 301, § 301(a)(2), 117 Stat. 752, 758 (2002). 
 105. See I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2006) (“At the election of the taxpayer, 
paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a) shall not apply to musical compositions 
or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in 
subsection (a)(3).”); Spencer Anastasio, Copyright Tax in the New Millennium, 
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2007, at 1, 24–25 (2007) (discussing the capital gains 
rate tax exception for sold musical compositions or copyrights in musical 
works). 
 106. See Capital Gains Tax Equity Act Becomes Law, NASHVILLE 
SONGWRITERS ASSOC. INT’L (May 11, 2006), 
http://legislative.nashvillesongwriters.com/news.php?viewStory=49. 
 107. See Tax Cut Package Contains Breaks for Songwriters, BROADCAST 
MUSIC, INC., (May 11, 2006), http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/334803. 
 108. See Capital Gains Tax Equity Act Becomes Law, supra note 106. 
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The songwriter capital gains rate provides a poor example of 
using tax to achieve copyright ends.  The scope of the tax break is 
quite limited.  No other individual authors get the benefit of capital 
gains treatment except for songwriters.109  (By contrast, all 
patentees are eligible for the capital gains rate for the sale of their 
patents.110)  Moreover, the policy behind the songwriter capital 
gains rate would appear to incentivize songwriters to sell their 
copyrights to others, instead of retaining their works and earning 
income through licensing.  Congress could use tax law far more 
comprehensively and sensibly to achieve copyright goals. 
2. State Tax Codes 
The states have used their tax codes in ways that more directly 
incentivize the creation of copyrighted works than has the federal 
government.  That is somewhat surprising, given that copyright law 
for fixed works is exclusively governed by federal law.111  Most 
states and Puerto Rico have special tax incentives to lure film 
studios to create movies within their state borders.112  The primary 
goal of these state tax incentives is to spur the state economies with 
the money spent by film studios on location (e.g., food and lodging) 
and with the added tourism and interest drawn to the area.113  Yet 
an additional benefit is that the film industry receives, in effect, a 
state subsidy to create a film in a particular state.  With the savings 
in expenses made possible by the tax breaks, some movie studios 
can presumably afford to invest in the creation of other films.  As 
with most tax expenditures, however, the tax breaks for movies 
remain controversial, especially as many states face budget crises in 
the economic downturn.114 
C. The Theory of the Tax Fix for Copyright Law 
The popularity of state tax incentives for film creation begs the 
question whether Congress should consider making greater use of 
tax incentives for copyrighted work under federal law.  Anecdotal 
evidence from the film industry suggests that movie studios are 
highly responsive to tax incentives to locate a movie production 
 
 109. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in 
Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 25 (2010). 
 110. I.R.C. § 1235 (2006); Nguyen & Maine, supra note 109, at 14. 
 111. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (describing preemption of state law). 
 112. See Joshua R. Schonauer, Star Billing? Recasting State Tax Incentives 
for the “Hollywood” Machine, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 386 & n.29 (2010) 
(discussing the benefits of low-cost destinations for film shoots); PRODUCERS 
GUILD OF AMERICA, http://www.filmusa.org (displaying a chart of states with tax 
incentives for movies) (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 113. Schonauer, supra note 112, at 387–91. 
 114. See, e.g., Alan Wirzbicki, Is the Massachusetts Film Tax Credit Worth 
the Cost?, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2011, 5:11 PM) http://www.boston.com 
/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle/2011/01/film_tax_credit.html. 
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within a state to obtain a tax break.115  Although the jury is still out 
on whether the film tax incentives have succeeded in boosting state 
economies, the evidence indicates that film studios have utilized the 
tax breaks in various states.116  For example, New Mexico’s twenty-
five percent tax refund for in-state movie production has reportedly 
brought in an estimated $600 million from 2003 to 2008 based on 
film productions of such high profile movies as No Country for Old 
Men, Terminator Salvation, Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the 
Crystal Skull, and Transformers.117  Although these state tax 
incentives for film production are not copyright reforms or efforts to 
modernize copyright law, they do provide an example of how the tax 
system can be used alongside copyright law.  This Part explains why 
Congress should go one step further and use tax incentives as a way 
to achieve copyright goals. 
D. Innovating Copyright Law Within International Copyright 
1. Treaties 
A major advantage of using the tax system to modernize 
copyright law is the flexibility the tax system offers.  By using the 
Tax Code instead of the Copyright Act, Congress has the freedom to 
consider a variety of copyright reforms that would not present any 
problems under international treaties.  Neither the Berne 
Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement speaks to, much less restricts, 
the ability of countries to impose taxes or create tax incentives 
related to copyrights.118 
Moreover, the tax fix is better than the current way typically 
used to get around the Berne Convention—that is, treating domestic 
 
 115. See, e.g., Michael Cieply, Jitters Are Setting In for States Giving Big 
Incentives to Lure Film Producers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A26. 
 116. See id. (discussing films made in Louisiana, Rhode Island, New Mexico, 
Michigan). 
 117. Schonauer, supra note 112, at 398–99; Cieply, supra note 115, at A26. 
 118. Although another WTO agreement does limit countries from using 
taxes that constitute “export subsidies,” the limitation is narrowly defined to 
subsidies that are “contingent . . . upon export performance.”  Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, ¶ 3 
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).  None of the tax 
incentives for copyright law contemplated by this Article would fall within this 
definition of export subsidy.  Moreover, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) does prohibit some tax measures that discriminate against 
foreign goods (a violation of national treatment).  See General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 
[hereinafter GATT]; Alan C. Swan, NAFTA Chapter 11—”Direct Effect” and 
Interpretive Method: Lessons from Methanex v. United States, 64 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 21, 63–64 (2009).  The taxes proposed herein do not discriminate against 
foreigners. 
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and foreign works differently.  Because the Berne Convention only 
regulates works of foreign origin, countries can impose requirements 
on domestic works that would otherwise violate Berne if applied to 
foreign works.119  For example, the U.S. Copyright Act requires 
registration as a precondition to bringing a copyright lawsuit for 
“United States works”—meaning works first published in the United 
States or, if unpublished, created by a U.S. national or resident.120  
Foreign works have no registration requirement under U.S. law 
because of Berne’s ban on formalities for foreign works.121  Likewise, 
some recent proposals to shorten the term of copyright in the United 
States adopt the same limitation to U.S. works, in order to avoid 
Berne’s minimum standard of a term that lasts the life of the author 
plus fifty years.122 
The differential treatment of domestic versus foreign works has 
several disadvantages.  First, it complicates the Copyright Act by 
having a two-track system: one for domestic works and another for 
foreign works.  Second, it has the effect of treating one’s own 
nationals worse than foreigners—a form of reverse discrimination 
that becomes less palatable as the disparities mount.  In addition, it 
may encourage strategic behavior among some copyright holders to 
publish first their works abroad, so their works will be treated as 
foreign works for the purposes of Berne.123  This strategic behavior 
might result in “off-shoring” of U.S. jobs and publishing resources 
for books, music, movies, and other works. 
By contrast, the tax fix avoids these problems.  A two-track 
system is not created in the Copyright Act.  There is no reverse 
discrimination between nationals and foreigners.  Each group would 
be treated the same under both copyright and tax law.  Without any 
preferential treatment for foreign works under the law, the need for 
strategic behavior and off-shoring of jobs and resources outside the 
United States would be minimized. 
2. Incentivizing Greater Choices for Copyright Holders 
Another advantage of the tax fix is that it will help to achieve 
greater tailoring of copyrights to particular individuals, industries, 
or circumstances.  As Michael Carroll and others have shown, the 
 
 119. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5 (“Authors shall enjoy, in 
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in 
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their 
respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the 
rights specially granted by this Convention.”) (emphasis added). 
 120. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) (requiring registration for “United States 
work”); id. § 101 (defining “United States work”). 
 121. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art 5(1). 
 122. Id. art. 7(1); see, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 79, at 554 (discussing the 
proposed Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003)). 
 123. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(a) (stating that a work’s 
country of origin is the country in which the work was first published). 
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“one size fits all” model of our current copyright system (by which 
most works are treated under the same general approach) is 
inefficient: “In particular, this policy imposes uniformity cost on 
society by failing to supply fine-grained rights tailored to the 
economic circumstances of different classes of authors and 
inventors.”124  For example, copyright law treats computer software 
the same as a literary work, even though software is functional and 
extremely short-lived in terms of its use.125  Likewise, small-time 
authors who have no intention of commercially exploiting their 
works and who may not even care about copyright, receive, 
nonetheless, the same rights under copyright as those authors who 
commercially exploit their works.126 
Instead of the “one size fits all” approach under the Copyright 
Act, tax law can give copyright holders a menu of options, with tax 
incentives, for how they might tailor their copyrights to their own 
particular circumstances.  Thus, instead of Congress deciding how 
best to tailor copyrights among copyright holders—a task that may 
be fraught with error, given the huge amount of information 
needed—each copyright holder, who arguably has the most 
information related to the copyright in question, can decide whether 
to elect from an assortment of self-tailoring options required for the 
tax benefits.  The tailoring by each copyright holder may lead to 
greater efficiency.  For example, instead of a ninety-five-year 
copyright, software companies may opt for shorter terms of 
copyright that correspond to the actual life span of software.  
Although the Copyright Act already includes some modest tailoring 
with respect to sound recordings, architectural works, useful 
articles, and certain industry-specific exemptions,127 tax law can 
provide even greater tailoring, individual taxpayer by individual 
taxpayer.  Presumably, each copyright holder is in a better position 
than Congress to make the most efficient choice of how to tailor a 
copyright to her own circumstances. 
3. Breaking the Political Stalemate Over Copyright Revision 
A final reason Congress should consider a tax fix for copyright 
law is that enacting a set of copyright tax breaks may be more 
politically feasible than a major overhaul of the copyright system.  If 
history is a guide, we can expect any major overhaul of the copyright 
system to provoke an intense battle among stakeholders.  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 took decades of study, hearings, and debate 
 
 124. See Carroll, supra note 63, at 1389 (emphasis omitted). 
 125. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 
2.04[C][2], 2.04[C][5] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011). 
 126. See id. § 5.01[A] (stating that copyright vests in the author at the time 
of creation without qualification). 
 127. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113–114, 118–120, 122 (2006). 
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before Congress eventually reached an agreement.128  The tenor of 
copyright debates today is even more divisive.129 
By contrast, with completely voluntary options under the 
proposed tax fix, copyright industries would have no reason to 
object.  The Copyright Act would remain the same, and many 
copyright holders could benefit financially from the proposed tax 
breaks.  The tax fix has the potential of undoing the stalemate that 
has plagued copyright debates in the past.  Depending on the 
proposal, Congress could justify the tax breaks for copyright holders 
as a way to spur greater efficiency in the copyright system, as well 
as greater innovation in the production and use of copyrighted 
works. 
III.  PROPOSAL: THE COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX AND  
COPYRIGHT TAX CREDIT 
This Part outlines several proposals that use tax incentives to 
further copyright reform objectives.  Two types of tax provisions are 
discussed: (1) a copyright gains tax and (2) a copyright tax credit. 
A. Copyright Registration as a Prerequisite to Tax Breaks 
Before discussing the proposed copyright tax breaks, we should 
discuss a prerequisite that would apply in either situation.  In order 
to obtain the copyright tax break, the copyright holder would be 
required to register its work in the Copyright Office.130 
This proposal would alleviate the growing orphan works 
problem and incentivize the registration of copyrighted works.  As 
the Copyright Office recognized, the orphan works problem “is, in 
some respects, a result of the omnibus revision to the Copyright Act 
in 1976,” which eliminated “the requirement that a copyright owner 
file a renewal registration in the 28th year of the term.”131  Under 
the 1909 Act, the renewal registration precluded an orphan works 
problem in two ways: (1) works that were not renewed in the 
twenty-eighth year automatically forfeited their copyrights, and (2) 
works that were renewed could be located (along with relevant 
 
 128. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, 
at 1:1–1:3 (Sept. 1977), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to 
-copyright.pdf. 
 129. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, at 
viii (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09 
-Copyright.pdf (“Because of the growing number and diversity of interests with 
a stake in the digital copyright debate, many observers believe that the 
Congress may need to legislate a balance in copyright law between private 
incentives and societal gains.”). 
 130. Private registries could be also used if the Copyright Act is revised to 
include third-party registrations as some commentators have proposed.  See 
COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 45, at 24. 
 131. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 3. 
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information about the copyright owners) in the Copyright Office 
registry.132  Though renewal registration had been a feature of U.S. 
copyright law since 1790, Congress eliminated it in 1976 so the 
United States could join the Berne Convention.133  Joining Berne 
was perceived as a way for the United States to assume “a more 
prominent role in the international copyright community.”134  But, 
as the Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters conceded, “there is no 
denying that [the changes in the Copyright Act of 1976] diminished 
the public record of copyright ownership and made it more difficult 
for the business of copyright to function.”135 
The proposal addresses this problem by requiring copyright 
registration as a precondition for obtaining any copyright tax break.  
A copyright holder would have to register its work in order to be 
eligible for the tax break.  In order to create added incentive to 
register the work early in the term of copyright, Congress could set a 
time period for registration, such as within five years of creation of 
the work.  The five-year window might encourage the owners of 
works that are not commercially exploited to register their works 
anyway, in the hopes of one day monetizing their creations.  
Copyright holders that fail to register within the first five years of 
copyright would not be eligible to obtain a copyright tax break.  
Having a uniform period for registrations of all works would make it 
easier to educate the public on when registration would be required 
to receive a tax break.  The incentive to register copyrighted works 
under the proposal might decrease the problem of orphan works by 
encouraging more registrations of works over time than under the 
current system.136  And it would do so without violating Berne’s 
prohibition on formalities.  In short, a voluntary registration to 
receive a tax break is not a copyright formality.137 
 
 132. See 1909 Act § 23, supra note 16 (requiring renewal registration in the 
twenty-eighth year of copyright). 
 133. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 3. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan 
Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/. 
 136. The tax incentives would probably affect a much greater number of 
works because many more works are commercially exploited than are ever 
involved in a lawsuit (which requires registration as a precondition).  See Lee, 
supra note 21, at 1542–43. 
 137. Cf. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 6.107-6.108, 
at 328–29 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that countries may use “carrots” to encourage 
registration because Berne “merely bars making compliance [with registration] 
mandatory for non-domestic works”). 
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B. The Copyright Gains Tax 
A preferential tax rate is one way to structure a tax incentive to 
pursue copyright reform objectives.  Similar to the capital gains tax 
rate,138 the proposed “copyright gains” tax provides a lower tax rate 
for income generated from copyrighted works, provided the 
copyright holder satisfies whatever requirements set by the 
copyright reform measure.  I discuss below two different copyright 
reform proposals: (1) shorter copyright terms and (2) mass licenses 
of works to the public.  These proposals are offered for illustrative 
purposes; other copyright reforms can be substituted in their 
place.139  The key takeaway is seeing how tax can facilitate a more 
flexible approach to copyrights to achieve public ends—the 
constitutional goal of the Copyright Clause.140 
1. Proposal 1: Opting for Shorter Copyright Terms 
Assume Congress decides to pursue the objective of encouraging 
shorter terms of copyright at the election of the copyright owner.141  
This policy could yield three benefits.  First, encouraging shorter 
copyright terms might reduce the problem of orphan works.  Older 
copyrighted works, whose owners are more likely to have since died 
or become defunct, are more susceptible to becoming orphan works. 
Second, allowing copyright owners to choose their own copyright 
terms avoids the inefficiencies of the current “one size fits all” 
approach to copyright.  Numerous works are not commercially 
exploited at all, and some commercial works (such as software) are 
exploited only for a few years.  For these works, a copyright that 
lasts the life of the author plus seventy years (or ninety-five years in 
the case of works-made-for-hire) makes no economic sense.  Third, 
shorter terms of copyright can spur, much sooner, follow-on 
creations and innovation based on works that have entered the 
public domain. 
 
 138. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
 139. It goes beyond the scope of this Article to justify or debate the merits of 
the copyright reforms discussed.  For the purposes of this Article, the merits of 
a particular copyright reform are not essential to understanding the method of 
using the Tax Code to further copyright objectives. 
 140. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 141. An extensive debate over the (de)merits of lengthy copyright terms 
followed the Supreme Court’s upholding of the constitutionality of the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which extended the terms of 
copyrights by twenty more years.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 
(2003); see also GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 38, at 52 (discussing the estimated 
economic effects of Eldred on the music industry); Marshall Leaffer, Life After 
Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1597, 1599–1606 (2004) (discussing the Eldred decision and its 
consequences for Article I, Congress, and the First Amendment). 
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a.  Basic Tax Structure 
Instead of changing the copyright term itself in the Copyright 
Act, Congress could enact a special tax break for copyright holders 
who voluntarily shorten the length of their copyrights.  Under our 
current law, copyright holders always have the option of choosing to 
abandon their copyrights or donate their works to the public 
domain.142  Of course, few copyright holders ever do so because they 
have very little incentive to donate their works to the public domain 
under the current system.  However, the tax fix for copyright terms 
can provide that incentive by rewarding copyright holders who 
choose shorter terms of copyrights by their own initiative. 
Imagine one possible scenario.  Congress enacts a tax break for 
copyright holders who elect to give up some of their copyright terms 
under the following graduated series of favorable tax rates on 
royalties.  Because the Copyright Act uses different metrics for 
copyright terms depending on whether the author is an individual or 
























 142. See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 191 F.2d 594, 597–98 (2d 
Cir. 1951). 
 143. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the 
Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003) (describing the 
evolution of Congress’s treatment of corporate authorship under the “works 
made for hire” exception to the Copyright Act); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (discussing the “works made for hire” 
doctrine). 
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TABLE 1:  COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX RATES FOR SHORTER TERMS 
 
Corporate Author 
Term of Copyright Chosen Copyright Gains Tax Rate 
Corporate Author elects a 1-year  
   copyright 5% of standard rate applies 
Corporate Author elects a 5-year  
   copyright 10% of standard rate applies 
Corporate Author elects a 50-year  
   copyright 50% of standard rate applies 
Corporate Author elects a 70-year  
   copyright 70% of standard rate applies 
Corporate Author keeps full term of  
   95 years Standard rate applies 
Individual Author 
Term of Copyright Chosen Copyright Gains Tax Rate 
Individual Author elects a 1-year  
   copyright 5% of standard rate applies 
Individual Author elects a 5-year  
   copyright 10% of standard rate applies 
Individual Author elects life term 40% of standard rate applies 
Individual Author elects a 50-year  
   copyright 50% of standard rate applies 
Individual Author elects a 70-year  
   copyright 70% of standard rate applies 
Individual Author keeps full term of  
   life plus 70 years Standard rate applies 
 
The proposed tax table attempts to treat individual and 
corporate authors the same in terms of the tax benefit gained.  The 
one difference is that the copyright terms for individual authors are 
defined by the life of the author plus seventy years, whereas 
corporate authors have a fixed term of ninety-five years from 
publication of the work (or 120 years from creation, whichever is 
sooner).  Thus, the tax table gives the option for the individual 
author to elect to receive a copyright for a work only during her 
lifetime.  Of course, the number of years in the life of the author 
varies according to when the work is created and when the author 
dies. 
Under the proposal, an author can elect a one-year term of 
copyright and receive a tax rate of 5% of the standard tax rate for 
royalties for the copyright holder’s income tax bracket.  For example, 
as depicted in Table 2, if an author falls within the highest tax 
bracket of 35%, her copyright gains tax rate would be only 2% of 
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income generated from the work.144  If the author elects a five-year 
copyright, her copyright gains tax rate would be 4%.  Electing a 
copyright for the life of the author would receive a tax rate of 14%.  
A fifty-year copyright would receive a tax rate of 18%, and a 
seventy-year copyright would receive a tax rate of 25%.  If the 
copyright owner keeps the entire term of copyright, she would be 
taxed at her normal rate of 35%.  In each case, the copyright owner 
decides whether to lower her term of copyright and receive a tax 
break in return. 
 
TABLE 2:  COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX FOR AUTHOR FROM  
HIGHEST TAX BRACKET OF 35% 
 
Term of Copyright Chosen Tax Rate on Royalties 
Individual Author elects a 1-year copyright 2% 
Individual Author elects a 5-year copyright 4% 
Individual Author elects life term 14% 
Individual Author elects a 50 year copyright 18% 
Individual Author elects a 70 year copyright 25% 
Individual Author keeps full term of life  
   plus 70 years 35% 
 
The tax break afforded to the copyright holder would apply or 
carryover for the remainder of the copyright term on the work in 
question.145  Congress could amend the general tax rates, which 
would affect the final copyright gains tax rate, but the discount 
percentages would remain at five, ten, forty, fifty, and seventy 
percent.  Of course, the tax rates above are merely illustrative.  The 
amounts can be lowered or increased, depending how much 
incentive Congress hoped to create.  The vital point is that Congress 
has considerable flexibility to incentivize copyright holders to 
shorten their terms of copyright. 
b.  Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright 
The beauty of the tax fix is that it completely bypasses Berne.  
First, Berne requires countries to recognize a copyright term of at 
least the life of the author plus fifty years.146  Thus, if Congress 
wanted to lower the copyright term to a shorter term for all works, 
Berne would forbid it.  A tax incentive, however, could help to 
 
 144. For simplicity, I have rounded all percentages in the tax rates to the 
nearest whole number. 
 145. Alternatively, if Congress wanted to create a more limited tax benefit, 
it could limit the preferential copyright gains tax rate to one year or a few 
years. 
 146. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(1). 
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achieve the same goal of shortening copyright terms without 
violating Berne. 
Second, Berne establishes a default rule known as the “rule of 
the shorter term.”147  It states: “[U]nless the legislation of that 
country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed 
in the country of origin of the work.”148  The rule means that 
countries with terms longer than the life of the author plus fifty 
years (e.g., the European Union has a term of life of the author plus 
seventy years) can give a shorter term to a work whose country of 
origin only provides for such shorter term.  For example, before 
Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
EU countries could give U.S. works the shorter term of life of the 
author plus fifty years—that is, “the term fixed in the country of 
origin of the work.”149  Even though the U.S. works in the European 
Union receive copyrights from EU countries, those European 
copyrights for the U.S. works received a copyright term shorter than 
what EU works received.150  The shorter term puts pressure on 
countries in the Berne Convention to raise their copyright terms 
whenever one country raises its term above the rest.  The United 
States did exactly that when the European Union raised its 
copyright term.151 
The tax fix avoids the rule of the shorter term—and the 
disadvantage imposed on nationals from a country with a shorter 
term.  Even if U.S. authors elect to give up part of their copyright 
terms, the copyright term in the Copyright Act still remains the 
same.  Thus, the tax incentive for copyright holders to reduce their 
own copyright terms would not alter, in any way, “the term fixed in 
the country of origin of the work.”152  The United States could adopt 
the tax fix, without disadvantaging U.S. works abroad, while 
achieving shorter copyright terms through voluntary choice by 
copyright holders. 
c.  Hypothetical Example: The Blair Witch Project 
To illustrate how the copyright gains tax would operate in 
practice, consider a hypothetical example using the independent 
film, The Blair Witch Project.  The small budget movie became a 
 
 147. Id. art. 7(8). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the 
United States and European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579, 614–15 (1996). 
 151. Michael Landau, Fitting United States Copyright Law into the 
International Scheme: Foreign and Domestic Challenges to Recent Legislation, 
23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 847, 858–59 (2007). 
 152. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(8) (emphasis added). 
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surprise box-office mega-hit, earning over $140 million in 1999.153  
The movie cost only $500,000 to $750,000 to make,154 so most of the 
earnings constituted income subject to tax (assuming no clever 
Hollywood accounting was used155). 
The high amount of income generated from the movie would put 
it at the highest tax rate.  For simplicity, I will use the current 2011 
tax rate of 35% in this hypothetical, instead of the 1999 tax rate.156  
Assuming the high-end estimate of the production expenses of 
$750,000, and applying the income forecast method of depreciation 
under § 167(g) of the Tax Code,157 with an assumption that most of 
the movie’s earnings occurred within the first ten years of the 
movie’s distribution,158 most of the costs (let’s say $724,100) can be 
deducted immediately.  The owner of the movie would have 
$139,814,999 in income, subject to a 35% tax—or $48,935,250 in tax. 
Under the proposal, the copyright owner of The Blair Witch 
Project could elect to reduce its federal tax by agreeing to a shorter 
copyright term. The options would be as follows: 
 
TABLE 3:  THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT INCOME  
UNDER COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX 
 
Copyright Term Tax Rate Income Tax Tax Savings 
1-year copyright 2% $2,796,300 $46,138,950 
5-year copyright 4% $5,592,600 $43,342,650 
50-year copyright 18% $25,166,700 $23,768,550 
70-year copyright 25% $34,953,750 $13,981,500 
 
Although the copyright holder would have to exercise its 
business judgment in deciding which tax incentive to select, the 
copyright holder might prefer a five-year copyright over a one-year 
copyright, or a fifty-year copyright over a seventy-year copyright.  
 
 153. See The Blair Witch Project, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=blairwitchproject.htm (last updated 
Oct. 27, 2011) (stating total domestic gross of $140,539,099). 
 154. See John Young, “The Blair Witch Project” 10 Years Later, ENT. WKLY., 
(July 9, 2009, 8:29 PM), http://popwatch.ew.com/2009/07/09/blair-witch/. 
 155. For more on the questionable accounting methods used by Hollywood 
studios, see BILL DANIELS ET AL., MOVIE MONEY: UNDERSTANDING HOLLYWOOD’S 
(CREATIVE) ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 10 (1998); Roman M. Silberfeld & Bernice 
Conn, The Red and the Black, L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 36. 
 156. In 1999, the top corporate tax rate in the United States was forty 
percent.  See Chris Edwards, The U.S. Corporate Tax Rate and the Global 
Economy, TAX AND BUDGET BULLETIN, No. 18, Sept. 2003, at 2, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0309-18.pdf.  So, if I used forty percent instead 
of thirty-five percent, the amount of taxes would be even higher. 
 157. See I.R.C. § 167(g) (2006). 
 158. I assumed the movie made only $5 million in profit in the nine years 
following its release. 
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The tax savings afforded by a one-year copyright over a five-year 
copyright is only $2.79 million, while having four more years of 
copyright would enable the copyright holder to make a derivative 
work (e.g., a sequel) exclusively during that period.  If the copyright 
holder desired a copyright term longer than five years, a fifty-year 
copyright might be preferred because it provides close to $10 million 
in additional tax savings beyond a seventy-year copyright.  The 
present value of any income derived in years fifty-one through 
seventy of the copyright term probably would not compare to the $10 
million in extra tax savings now. 
In terms of mechanics, the copyright holder would have to 
register the copyright for The Blair Witch Project and also file notice 
of its decision to abandon its copyright after the chosen number of 
years.  The public notice would be contained in the copyright 
registration, all accessible online, similar to disclaimers in 
trademark registration. 
The example illustrates how tax incentives might induce 
copyright holders to elect to have shorter terms of copyright, 
perhaps even as short as five years or less.  Although The Blair 
Witch Project provides an extreme example of massive profits from a 
work, it shows the attractiveness of a copyright gains tax.  Of 
course, the precise tax rates set for the copyright gains tax would 
require further study and debate.  The numbers above are meant for 
heuristic purposes. 
2. Proposal 2: Opting for Licenses for Public Use of a Work 
a.  Basic Tax Structure 
The copyright gains tax can also be used for other copyright 
objectives.  Imagine Congress wanted to encourage copyright 
holders to allow greater exploitation of their works, including in 
derivative works.  This initiative could spur greater follow-on 
creations, earlier in the term of the copyright.159  Instead of having 
to wait until the work enters the public domain, the public could 
exploit the works in ways greater than allowed currently under 
copyright law.  A copyright gains tax would apply if a copyright 
holder elected, within the first five years of copyright, to adopt a 
free, mass license to allow the public to make derivative works for 
the remainder of the copyright.  The mass license could be a 
Creative Commons license, which is a popular way for copyright 
 
159. For more on how the derivative works right can retard follow-on 
creations, see Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A 
Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 677–81 (2010); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, 
Derivative Works, and the Economics of Complements, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 779, 782 (2010); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 53 (2002). 
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holders to mass license their works.160  For example, the Creative 
Commons-By license requires the follow-on user to provide 
attribution to the original author in using the work.161  The election 
period might be set at the first five years of copyright for a work, in 
order to allow the public to use the work when it is recent and to 
maximize the amount of time afforded to the public to utilize the 
work in making new, derivative works. 
The precise tax rates set would require further study and 
debate.  For illustrative purposes, the copyright gains tax for 
allowing derivative works could be set as follows: 
 
TABLE 4:  COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX FOR COPYRIGHT  
HOLDERS’ MASS LICENSES 
 
Election By Copyright Holder Copyright Gains Tax Rate 
Author elects derivative work (“DW”)  
   mass license, including commercial  
   and noncommercial uses 60% of standard rate applies 
Author elects DW mass license, only for  
   noncommercial uses 90% of standard rate applies 
 
Thus, the copyright holder receives a ten percent discount on 
the standard tax rate on income generated from a work for which it 
has authorized a mass license to the public to make derivative 
works only for noncommercial purposes.  Similarly, a copyright 
holder receives a forty percent discount on the standard tax rate on 
income generated from a work for which it has authorized a mass 
license on the public to make derivative works for both commercial 
and noncommercial purposes.  The greater discount is given to 
allowing commercial derivative works, in part because those works 
will possibly generate economic activity and further income subject 
to tax.  The added tax revenue could help offset the losses in tax 
revenue created by the preferential copyright gains tax rate. 
b.  Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright 
As in the case of shorter copyright terms, the main advantage of 
using the Tax Code here is that it achieves greater flexibility 
without raising Berne Convention problems.  Articles 12 and 14 of 
Berne require countries to recognize a set of adaptation rights—
commonly known under the umbrella of the right to make derivative 
works.162  Thus, the United States could not substantially diminish 
 
 160. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 45, 47–48 (2006). 
 161. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org 
/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 162. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 12, 14. 
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the right to make derivative works, at least not for foreign works, 
without violating the Berne Convention.  Moreover, the right to 
make a derivative work arguably serves a useful purpose in 
incentivizing authors to create not only a first work but also, 
potentially, a derivative work.  The copyright gains tax, however, 
could make the derivative work right more flexible.  The flexibility 
could incentivize copyright holders to promote socially productive re-
uses of their works.  For example, the growth of noncommercial fan-
fiction online—short stories created by third parties based on 
famous works like Harry Potter—currently occupies an uncertain 
status between possible infringement and fair use.163  One easy way 
to clear up this uncertainty is to encourage authors themselves to 
mass license their works. 
c.  Hypothetical Example: The Blair Witch Project 
Let us return to the example of The Blair Witch Project.  
Imagine the copyright holder grants the public a mass license to use 
the movie in noncommercial derivative works, such as remix 
videos.164  The mass license would be recorded in the Copyright 
Office, along with the registration of the work.  Copies of the work 
could be required to indicate a mass license has been granted to the 
public for reuse of the work (such as by the Creative Commons 
symbols).  As shown in Table 5 below, under the copyright gains tax 
rate, the copyright holder would be taxed at 90% of the standard tax 
rate that applies—meaning the rate would lower from the highest 
tax rate of 35% to the discounted rate of 32%.  Applying the 
preferential rate would lower the tax from $48,935,250 to 
$44,740,800, a decent savings of $4.2 million. 
The copyright holder can obtain an even larger tax benefit of 
60% of the standard rate by opting to allow commercial derivative 
works as well.  In such case, the tax rate would lower from 35% to 
21%, with a tax of $29,389,500—which equals a tax savings of $19.6 
million. 
 
TABLE 5:  THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT INCOME 










Noncommercial DWs 32% $44,740,800 $4,194,350 
All DWs 21% $29,361,150 $19,574,100 
 
 
 163. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1530–31. 
 164. Id. at 1508–09. 
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In essence, through the tax expenditure of the copyright gains 
tax, the government is investing in follow-on creations and 
innovation from copyrighted works. 
C. Copyright Tax Credits 
1. Structure of Copyright Tax Credit 
Another way to use the Tax Code to further copyright objectives 
is through tax credits.165  Typically, a tax credit would provide a 
smaller tax benefit than a preferential tax rate.  Deductions reduce 
one’s taxable income and thus translate into different amounts 
depending on the taxpayer’s tax bracket; tax credits, however, offer 
dollar-for-dollar amounts reducing one’s tax liability, irrespective of 
tax bracket.166  A tax credit allows Congress to set fixed dollar 
amounts for reducing one’s tax instead of having the tax benefit 
fluctuate, such as in a tax rate, although the amount of the tax 
credit could be made to change to different levels of income.  For 
example, the child tax credit is up to $1,000 for each qualifying child 
under seventeen years old.167  Tax credits can also be made 
refundable, meaning if the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer in a 
given year is less than the amount of tax owed, the difference 
between the credit and tax owed is refunded by the federal 
government to the taxpayer.168  Alternatively, the tax credits can be 
nonrefundable but subject to “carry over,” or used in following tax 
year(s) when there is positive income.169 
As in the case of the copyright gains tax, the proposed copyright 
tax credits would be dependent on copyright registration of a work 
by the same year the tax credit is sought.  The next step would be 
identifying a copyright objective worthy of a tax credit. 
Imagine Congress wants to incentivize authors to allow more 
free uses of their copyrighted works in schools, in order to encourage 
learning with a greater diversity of materials and to help defray the 
rising costs of education.170  A tax credit could be awarded to any 
copyright holder for each school that requested and received 
permission to use its work in the classroom for free.  As shown in 
Table 6, the tax credit might be set at, let’s say, $50 per school to 
 
 165. See generally Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549 
(2008) (describing the benefit of tax credits over deductions and exclusions). 
 166. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Moss, Solar Panels, Tax Incentives, and Your House, 
PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 17, 18 (2010). 
 167. I.R.C. § 24 (2006). 
 168. Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long 
View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417, 443 n.131 (2011). 
 169. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 166, at 20 (discussing carryover for North 
Carolina renewable energy tax credit). 
 170. College tuition has risen, on average, over 136% during the past twenty 
years.  See Laura Meckler & Stephanie Banchero, U.S. News: Obama Plans to 
Curb Tuition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2012, at A3. 
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which the author granted free use—including copying, public 
performances, and adaptations—of part of a copyrighted work in the 
classroom or at school, and $150 for each school granted free use of 
an entire copyrighted work.  The tax credit could be in addition to 
any deduction allowed for donation of material to a charitable 
institution,171 given that the donation here would encompass acts of 
copying, performing, and adapting not measured within the amount 
for donation of copies of works.  A cap can also be set on the 
maximum amount of copyright tax credits (e.g., $15,000) that a 
taxpayer can claim each year. 
 
TABLE 6:  COPYRIGHT TAX CREDIT FOR  
FREE EDUCATIONAL LICENSES 
 
Free Educational License Tax Credit Cap 
Part of work licensed $50 per school $15,000 total 
Entirety of work licensed $150 per school $15,000 total 
 
2. Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright Exemptions 
Again, the main advantage of using the Tax Code instead of 
copyright law is to provide greater flexibility to copyright in a way 
that skirts any problems with international obligations.  Instead of 
creating broad copyright exemptions for schools that could be 
subject to international challenge in the WTO, Congress could use 
tax credits to promote the same objectives without raising any issue 
of compliance with the Berne Convention or the TRIPS Agreement.  
In addition, the proposed copyright tax credits have the added 
benefit of promoting education and potentially helping to address 
the escalating costs of education, including textbooks, which are 





 171. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (allowing tax deductions for contributions to 
charitable institutions). 
 172. See NATSUKO HAYASHI NICHOLLS, SCHOLARLY PUBL’G OFFICE, UNIV. OF 
MICH. LIBRARY, THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RISING COSTS OF TEXTBOOKS 4–5 
(2009), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78553; see also id. at 5 
(“[B]etween December of 1986 and December of 2004, textbook prices have 
increased at twice the rate of inflation, increasing by 186 percent, whereas 
tuition and fees increased by 240 percent and overall price inflation grew by 72 
percent.  While increases in textbook prices have followed close behind tuition 
increases, the estimated cost of textbooks and supplies for the average four-year 
undergraduate student was $898 for the academic year 2003–2004, or about 26 
percent of the cost of tuition and fees at four-year public institutions.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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a.  Hypothetical Example: Open-Source Textbooks 
To understand how the proposed copyright tax credit would 
operate, imagine Author creates an “open source” digital textbook 
free for others to use and copy.  Twenty schools adopt the textbook 
for use in their classrooms.  The digital copies are disseminated for 
free to the students in each school.  As depicted in Table 7, Author is 
able to receive a tax credit of $3,000 (20 times $150) for sharing her 
entire textbook with twenty schools.  To obtain the tax credits, 
Author would have to register the copyright, keep proper records of 
the names of the schools receiving the textbook (subject to audit), 
and indicate, on the tax form, her election of the copyright tax 
credits.  If the same schools use Author’s textbook the following 
year, Author would be entitled to the same tax credit. 
 
TABLE 7:  OPEN SOURCE TEXTBOOK WITH FREE EDUCATIONAL 




Tax Credit Schools Total 
Entirety of work licensed $150 per school 20 $3,000 
 
IV.  ADDRESSING CONCERNS 
This final Part addresses objections to the tax fix to copyright 
law.  Although the tax fix affords greater flexibility to copyright 
initiatives without raising any international treaty concerns, it may 
produce other side effects worth considering. 
A. Tax Concerns 
1. Tax Expenditures and Revenue Depletion 
The biggest objection to the proposals above is their cost.  
Congress must consider the costs and benefits of the proposals, 
informed by analysis by economists and policymakers.  To be sure, 
the debt crisis and economic downturn in the United States pose 
many challenges for U.S. fiscal policy.173  Some experts may 
question the desirability of tax cuts when the economy is weak and 
the federal government faces huge budget deficits.174  The issue is at 
least debatable.  In 2009, the Obama Administration cut taxes for 
 
 173. See Peter Coy, Why the Debt Crisis Is Even Worse Than You Think, 
BUSINESSWEEK, (July 27, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://www.businessweek.com 
/magazine/why-the-debt-crisis-is-even-worse-than-you-think-07272011.html. 
 174. See The Fallacy of Using Tax Cuts to Fix Recession, NPR (Feb. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=100746977 (interview with David Cay Johnston). 
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the middle class in an effort to stimulate the economy.175  In 2011, 
Democrats and Republicans both were proposing different tax cuts 
as a way to boost the economy.176  In any event, Congress will not 
likely consider copyright reforms until later this decade, at a time 
when the U.S. economy is (hopefully) better.  Congress can always 
adopt smaller tax breaks as a part of an incremental approach to 
copyright reform.  And, to the extent the current debate over 
reforming the U.S. tax system will force Congress to make the tax 
system more transparent and with fewer loopholes, the current 
debate may pave the way for the kind of copyright reform proposed 
herein.  From an economic view, giving preferential tax rates in a 
way that incentivizes the creation of more copyrighted works makes 
sense, given how much the copyright industries contribute to U.S. 
GDP and exports overseas.177 
The proposed copyright tax reforms may not necessarily lead to 
large tax expenditures over the long run.  Stimulating the creation 
of more works much sooner during the copyright term is one of the 
primary goals of the proposed copyright gains tax.  Copyright 
holders are incentivized, with a preferential tax rate, to allow their 
works to be used and adapted by many more people—including 
commercially—much sooner than before.  Instead of waiting ninety-
five years to see the mass public exploitation of works, now such 
exploitation could occur in five years or less.  The potential 
proliferation of follow-on creations to existing, popular works could 
generate significant income—itself subject to tax—that would not 
have been created without the copyright gains tax incentive. 
Indeed, one attractive feature of the copyright gains tax is that 
the works that would cost the most in terms of tax expenditures 
(meaning they generate the most income that is then subject to a 
lower tax rate at the election of the copyright owner) would also 
have the greatest potential of spurring commercial follow-on 
creations that can generate even more income.  The most popular 
works commercially are likely to be the most attractive for people to 
adapt and build on—and the most likely to lead to other income-
generating derivative works.  In other words, popularity can be 
monetized—and then taxed. 
 
 175. See Heidi Przybyla & John McCormick, Poll: Americans Don’t Know 
Economy Expanded with Tax Cuts, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 29, 2010, 11:19 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-29/poll-shows-americans-don-t-know-e
conomy-expanded-with-tax-cuts.html (“The Obama administration has cut 
taxes—largely for the middle class—by $240 billion since taking office . . . .”). 
 176. See Opinion, An Inferior Tax Cut: A Temporary Payroll Break Won’t 
Help Growth or Hiring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at A12 (discussing Democrat 
payroll tax cut plan and Republican plan for tax cuts for individuals and 
businesses). 
 177. See INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (IIPA), COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003–2007 REPORT 5–7 (2009), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2003-07.pdf. 
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While many follow-on creations or derivative works would not 
generate income subject to tax, it is likely that some would.  In the 
movie industry, Hollywood studios have routinely made large 
revenues from adaptations of public domain works—including the 
incredibly successful movies Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs 
(which grossed nearly $185 million in 1937), Pinocchio ($84 million 
in 1940), and Aladdin ($217 million in 1992).178  The proposal would 
enhance the possibility of income generation from derivative works 
because the underlying works would be more contemporary—which 
enhances the marketability of follow-on creations.  For example, a 
sequel to Harry Potter, Twilight, or Glee would likely be more 
marketable today than in the year 2081. 
In addition, the copyright gains tax might attract new 
entrants—meaning new creators—into content production, which 
might in turn generate even more taxable income than would 
otherwise have arisen.  For example, the preferential copyright 
gains tax might make it more economically feasible for “starving 
artists” to make a living and pursue their passion as a profession.179  
Among the new entrants to creative professions may be a few who 
become the next J.K. Rowling or Justin Bieber, in terms of their 
commercial success—again generating income subject to tax. 
Even if the new entrants have only modest commercial success, 
the number of new entrants in the so-called “long tail”180 may be 
large enough to yield a decent source of additional income subject to 
tax.  Also, the added incentives to register copyrighted works may 
lead to an increase in registrations.  People who might not otherwise 
register their works might be induced to register, in order to 
preserve the possibility of a tax benefit.  The fee for registration, 
although modest, could generate more revenues for the government 
in the long-term.181 
The multiple ways in which new income streams might be 
generated under the copyright gains tax are arguably less prone to 
manipulation than under the capital gains tax.  The majority of 
capital gains are derived from sales of stocks, and of business and 
rental real estate.182  Thus, the problem of “lock-in” occurs with 
capital investments because investors may hold on to their stocks 
 
 178. Brief for Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (No. 10-544), 2011 WL 2470832 app. A. 
 179. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381, 387–94 (2009) (arguing that the copyright system 
should be designed in part to facilitate professional authors). 
 180. See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF 
BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006). 
 181. The fee in 2011 is $50 for paper registration and $35 for electronic 
registration.  Registering a Work (FAQ), U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (last modified 
Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-register.html. 
 182. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 110TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES 
390–91 (Comm. Print 2008). 
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and other investments in order to avoid having to pay tax on gains 
accrued from their sale.183  By contrast, the copyright gains tax 
would probably not lead to a “lock-in” effect because most creators 
probably have an incentive to share and market their works 
commercially, instead of holding on to them. 
The Blair Witch Project example shows how additional tax 
revenues might be generated from the copyright gains tax.184  
Imagine that the copyright owner of the movie opted for the five-
year copyright, thereby saving $43.3 million from the preferential 
rate of tax in 2011.  That $43.3 million represents the tax 
expenditure the federal government made in enacting the copyright 
gains tax as applied to the movie.  The tax expenditure by the 
federal government might be recovered in several ways. 
First, the copyright owner might use part of the $43.3 million to 
finance a sequel.  The production of the sequel would very likely 
pump money into local businesses where the film is produced.  Even 
if the sequel performed only one third as well as the first movie and 
earned $46.2 million at the box office, the tax owed by the copyright 
holder could be over $15 million, depending on how much the sequel 
cost to produce.  Second, the creation of other derivative works of 
The Blair Witch Project—merchandise, video games, toys, and the 
like—by the copyright owner or third parties could also generate 
more income subject to tax.  According to movie industry expert 
Steven Gaydos, merchandising can generate between $50 and $200 
million if the movie is popular.185  For example, in 2002, the Harry 
Potter franchise generated $11.8 million simply based on sales of 
Harry Potter cookies, candy, and gum.186  In total, Harry Potter 
amassed a staggering $7 billion in merchandising sales and $1.5 
billion in video game sales worldwide.187  Third, the financial 
attractiveness of the copyright gains tax for The Blair Witch Project 
might lure other creators to enter the field who might not otherwise 
have pursued creative professions.  To the extent those new entrants 
 
 183. See NONNA A. NATO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41480, RAISING THE TAX 
RATES ON HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS: PROS AND CONS 17 (2010). 
 184. The Blair Witch Project is a rare example of a mega-blockbuster movie 
that cost very little to produce so the amount of potential tax savings for the 
movie may be larger than what would be typical in the “long tail” of creative 
productions.  See generally ANDERSON, supra note 180 (discussing how many, 
smaller-income-generating works may produce substantial income in 
aggregate).  As an example of a potentially large tax savings, it provides a good 
measuring stick to test the desirability of the copyright gains tax. 
 185. See Emma Clark, How Films Make Money, (Nov. 12, 2001), BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1646640.stm. 
 186. See Allison Linn, Retailers Hope Harry Potter Proves Magical, MSNBC 
(July 16, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19745297/ns/business 
-us_business/t/retailers-hope-harry-potter-proves-magical/. 
 187. See Ethan Smith, Michelle Kung & Robert A. Guth, Potter Studio Tries 
to Keep Profits from Going Poof!, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2011, at A1. 
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produce taxable income from their copyrighted works, some of the 
loss in tax revenue from copyright holders’ election of the copyright 
gains tax would be further offset. 
Thus, the copyright gains tax can spur a greater number of 
creative works much sooner than under the current copyright 
system, without necessarily causing huge tax expenditures for the 
federal government.  The income generated from the follow-on 
creations would be taxed and help to offset the loss in tax revenue 
from the preferential rate.  Moreover, noncommercial follow-on 
creations provide a social benefit or positive externalities in their 
own right in a way that is not captured by income. 
2. Gaming the System and Tax Fraud 
As with any tax provision, the proposed copyright gains tax and 
copyright tax credit will be susceptible to clever attempts by some 
taxpayers to game the system, if not commit outright tax fraud.  For 
example, in the past, some corporations have set up foreign 
companies in order to minimize or avoid U.S. tax exposure—a 
practice of expatriation that Congress attempted to discourage in 
2004 by closing the tax loophole.188  Drafters of the copyright tax 
breaks must vet the provisions and attempt to formulate them in a 
way that minimizes the potential for similar gaming of the system.  
But, as one court put it, “[e]ven the smartest drafters of legislation 
and regulation cannot be expected to anticipate every device.”189  
Accordingly, the IRS should monitor the implementation of the 
copyright tax fixes to identify any gaming of the system, so Congress 
might close any loopholes. 
3. Unequal Tax Treatment of Other IP 
The proposal for copyright “tax fixes” begs the question whether 
the Tax Code should be used in a similar way for the patent and 
trademark systems.  As Jeffrey Maine and Xuan-Thao Nguyen have 
identified, principles of horizontal tax equity demand consideration 
of treating the taxation of income generated from different 
intellectual property alike, if they are truly similarly situated.190  
However, some of the problems addressed by the proposed tax fixes 
are idiosyncratic to copyright.  The optional registration system, 
lengthy terms, and problem of orphan works are not present in the 
patent or trademark systems.191  The potential benefits from 
 
 188. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate 
Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of 
Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 505–07, 545 (2005); I.R.C. § 
7874 (2006); see also id. §§ 951-65, 1291-98 (provisions governing tax treatment 
of controlled foreign corporations and passive foreign investment companies). 
 189. ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 190. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 109, at 14. 
 191. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 15. 
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incentivizing greater uses of IP, though, are relevant to both 
copyright and patent.  A similar tax incentive for patent holders 
authorizing mass licenses to create derivative inventions might also 
be considered. 
B. Copyright Concerns 
Some may object to the specific copyright reforms proposed, 
particularly the incentives for shorter terms and more liberal 
licenses for derivative works.  Some copyright holders would argue 
that they need a longer term and even more rights and enforcement 
measures, given the ease of infringement on the Internet today.  On 
the flip side, some public interest advocates might criticize the 
copyright gains tax proposals because the copyright gains tax does 
not reward noncommercial productions.  Each objection is discussed 
in turn. 
1. Need for Stronger Copyright? 
No doubt some copyright holders may desire longer terms of 
copyright and even more rights.  The history of copyright in the 
United States has demonstrated that copyright industries have been 
incredibly successful in obtaining expansions and extensions of 
copyright over time.192 
Whether or not these expansions and extensions should be 
ratcheted even higher in the twenty-first century is a policy debate 
that I do not undertake here.  One attractive feature of the tax fix 
proposal is that it leaves the current high levels of copyright 
protection and long copyright term completely untouched.  While the 
Copyright Act remains the same, the Tax Code adds greater 
incentives and flexibility to accommodate a diverse group of 
copyright holders—some of whom may prefer maximalist copyright 
protection, others of whom may prefer maximalist tax benefits.  
Under the tax fix, the “one size fits all” approach of the Copyright 
Act is modified, but only for those copyright holders who want to 
modify it.  In popular parlance, the tax fix is an “opt in” system.193 
It is also important to bear in mind that the particular 
copyright proposals offered above are meant as illustrations of how 
the Tax Code can be used to facilitate copyright objectives.  One 
need not agree with the copyright proposals in order to see the 
attractiveness of using the Tax Code to further copyright goals, 
whatever they may be. 
 
 192. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual 
Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
 193. See Marc H. Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright’s 
Growing Pains, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 n.137 (2007). 
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2. No Tax Help for Noncommercial Works? 
Public interest advocates might criticize the tax proposals as 
biased against amateur creators and noncommercial works.  
Creators of noncommercial works are not able to benefit from a 
preferential copyright gains tax rate.  If no income is derived from a 
work, there is no “gain” to tax. 
The criticism is valid, but only to some extent.  Even 
noncommercial creators can benefit from the copyright gains tax if it 
is successful in inducing other copyright owners to allow their works 
either to enter the public domain sooner or to be mass-licensed for 
public use.  The noncommercial creators benefit directly by having 
more underlying material—both commercial and noncommercial 
works—from which to draw.  Moreover, under the copyright tax 
credit for educational uses of copyrighted works, the author does not 
need to generate income from her own works in order to benefit from 
the tax credit.  The tax credit applies whether or not the work has 
generated income. 
C. Administrative Concerns 
1. Complicating the Tax Code and Copyright Act 
Another objection to the tax fix to copyright law is that it would 
further complicate the Tax Code and copyright law, both of which 
are already complicated, if not incomprehensible, enough.194  Using 
a tax fix—using tax law to further copyright objectives—would only 
exacerbate the difficulty for the public to understand tax and 
copyright.  It may yield a “double whammy” in terms of complicating 
both laws. 
The criticism of complexity is valid.  The tax fix to copyright law 
will make things more complicated.  Drafters of the tax fix should 
strive to design a copyright gains tax and credit that will be easy to 
understand.  Also, the tax forms and schedules for the copyright 
gains tax and tax credit should be written in a user-friendly format.  
Just as with any change to the Tax Code or Copyright Act, programs 
should be developed to educate the public about the changes.  To the 
 
 194. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1539 (“This inherent uncertainty makes the 
Copyright Act even worse than the Tax Code, which, despite its complexity, 
provides millions of taxpayers at least with enough certainty for them to figure 
out how much taxes to pay each year—even providing the public with the option 
of electing the simpler, standard deduction.”); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting 
Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 
396 (2005) (“[T]he complexity of the copyright statute already compares 
unfavorably to the tax code . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE 
ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 25 
(2009); Tax Code Complexity: New Hope for Fresh Solutions: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 39–40 (2001) (statement of Richard M. Lipton, 
Chair, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association). 
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extent that complexity is unavoidable, it may be a tradeoff for 
making the Copyright Act more flexible for the twenty-first century.  
The tradeoff may be worth making if the potential social benefit is 
great, and the amount of complexity added is not too onerous for the 
public to understand. 
2. Coordination of Tax and Copyright Components 
One final objection is administrative: the tax fix will require 
coordination between the Internal Revenue Service and Copyright 
Office.  Such interagency coordination may be difficult to achieve.  
Yet the IRS is a relatively well-functioning agency in managing tax 
filings of millions of U.S. residents each year.195  The Copyright 
Office has not had as large an administrative responsibility as the 
IRS, but the proposals do not require the Copyright Office to do 
much more than overseeing the registration process—something it 
has historically done.  The key additional component would be 
ensuring that taxpayers who invoke the copyright tax breaks have 
registered their works and recorded the relevant information 
concerning their copyrights (e.g., shorter term, mass licenses to the 
public) in the Copyright Office.  But this burden can be handled by a 
requirement of disclosure of copyright registration on the tax form, 
plus the penalty of perjury that governs tax forms.196  Successful 
coordination among patent offices in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan in sharing information and reviewing patent applications 
under the Trilateral Review suggests that interagency coordination 
between the IRS and Copyright Office would be feasible.197  If three 
countries can coordinate their offices, then two agencies within the 
United States should be able to coordinate as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 is due for a major revision to 
update copyright law and reduce the inefficiencies of the copyright 
system.  This Article proposes using the Tax Code as an alternative 
way to reform or modernize copyright law.  The main advantage of 
this approach is that it allows Congress much greater flexibility for 
reforms that do not implicate, much less violate, the international 
obligations of the Berne Convention or TRIPS Agreement.  The 
approach also may be more efficient in allowing copyright holders to 
tailor copyrights to their own situations and needs, instead of 
imposing a “one size fits all” approach on all copyright holders. 
 
 195. See Statistics: Individual Tax, IRS TAX STATS (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=238634,00.html. 
 196. In addition, the IRS and Copyright Office can coordinate their 
electronic databases to match up a tax filing to a registered copyrighted work. 
 197. See Significant Achievements, TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net 
/about/achievements.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
